of Lijphart's analysis. However, contrary to Lijphart, a positive relationship W;LS found between disproportionality and multipartism for PR systems. Particularly well supported were Lijphart's finding of (1) an inverse relationship between district magnitude and ~ispr~~po~io~iity and (2) a strong r~~ti~~nship between clcctoral formula and tlisproportionality.
'1%~ article demonstrates the applicability of a portion of Anglo-European theory to party systems in a region with democratic histories and economic profiles which are radically different from those of the systems upon which Kae and Lijphart based their findings.
During the past decade the world witnessed a progressive growth in the number of nations conducting generally free competitive elections, and, for the most part, conforming to the norms of democratic society. While both popular and academic presses have devoted many pages to the description of the growth of parties and the administration of elections in these incipient democracies, relatively little attention has been given to the ex~lrn~nati(~l~ of electoral laws. There has been little discussion of how various laws might affect the current and future types of party systems and representation in government in 'democratizing' countries. Since many of these nations have based their electoral system on Anglo-European models. it is both theoretically and practically relevant to assess the applicability of 'First World theories about electoral structures to nations currently in the process of democratizatictnlredemocrtizatictn.
If ~~Io-ELlrop~~I~ based theories seem to work, then not only will their importance as part of general theory be increased, but the results of the exercise may be of practical use to policy makers attempting to construct electoral systems in democratizing countries. The theoretical literature on the impact of electoral laws on party systems has focused primarily on the An~l(~-ELlr~~pean nations (e.g., Duverger, 1954; Rae, 197 Sartori, 1976) .' This article is focused on a specific component of this literature, U)ougias RX's seminai stud), IX? Politic-d Consrquenc~.s of I:'lec-tom1 Lazes (Rae, 1971) , and Arend Lijphart's rc-analysis of it (Lijphart, The first independent variable is the electoral formula. Whereas Rae utilized three classifications when examining electoral formula, Lijphart employed four separate groups: (1) plurality and majority; and then among the proportional representation systems, in hypothesized order from least to most proportional; (2) the d'Hondt formula; (3) the modified Sainte-Lague, LR-Droop, LR-Imperiali, STV-Droop formulas; and (4) the pure Sainte-La@ and LR-Hare formulas (Lijphart, 1990: 484-5) . This study utilizes the same classifications as Lijphart with the exception of his third category due to the absence of any of these formulas in the systems included in the study.
The second independent variable is the average district magnitude. Lijphart (1990: 486) (1088) found that in nations where the presidential elections were held concurrently with those for the national legislature, holding other factors constant, the level of disproportionality and multipartism were lower than was the case in countries where the elections were held at separate times. Shugart. however, did not deal with the cases where the timing of the elections was ambiguous. In the discussion that follows, the independent variable for election timing has been operationalized as a three point ordinal scale based on the degree of temporal concurrence between the presidential and legislative elections.
The Population
The are relatively unaffected by those of the metropolitan power. Moreover these two systems possess a set of unique qualities; they provide a nonHispanic proportional representation system and a Hispanic plurality system respectively. that recommended their inclusion in the study. A third requisite focused on data avaiiability. The electoral system of a nation had to be amenable to analysis utilizing the methods employed by Lijphart," and the data for any given election had to be complete in order to he included in the study.' In all, data were collected for 86 elections in 22 nations/territories, from which averages were calculated for each of the 22 electoral systems. Following Lijphart's focus on electoral systems rather than elections, and using Lijphart's variable definitions, the data set assembled permits analysis of the applicability of the four general theories in the Lijphart/Rae work on the impact of electoral formula and district magnitude on electoral disproportionality and multipartism in a set of non-Anglo-European electoral systems.
Electoral Formula and Electoral Dispropo~ion~~
Lijphart found plurality-majority systems to be more disproportional than proportional representation (PR) systems. He also detected a progressive decrease in disproportional&y as one moves from the (hypothesized) least proportional PR system (d'Honcit) to the most proportional (LR-Hare and pure Sainte-LaguC) (see Table 2 ). Finally, Lijphart found that the impact of formula persists when district magnitude is held constant.
LR-Droop LR-Impcriali STV-Droop etc
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Note: The numbers of cases on which the pcrcentagcs are based arc in parenthcscs "Except France of 1951-56. Source: (Lijphart, 1990: 485) The Latin American data suggest a similar relationship between formula and disproportionality with plurality systems being the most disproportional, followed by the d'Hondt PR system (the least proportional of the PR family according to Lijphart), concluding with the Hare system. Similarly when we hold district magnitude constant to test for the independent effect of formula, the Latin American data, like Lijphart's, show a similar independent effect in two of the three PR magnitude categories (see rows two and three in Table 3 ). In sum, the findings of this study are congruent with those of Lijphart regarding the impact of electoral formula on disproportionality.
Our findings thus strengthen the generalizability of this portion of Lijphart's theory.
District ~Magnitude and Electoral Disproportionality
In his examination of the impzict of district magnitude (that is, the :tverage number of representatives l3er district) on electoral dispropc,rtiotlalit~ Lijphart ( 1990: ,487) Table  2 ). I>isl3rol3~~rtion;5lit~ ckcrc;ises as one mo\x3 Ii-om tower to higher l~~;i~ilitl5~i~s. with the greatest chang:r occurring brtwren the Lijphart (1990: 483) and found in the OLS analysis between the two independent variables (the correlation between formula and magnitude is .80), OLS could not be used to determine the independent impact of these two variables on either of the two dependent variables. However, this multicollinearity neither intrudes on the interpretation of the cross tabulations nor minimizes the demonstration of systematic variability within categories. Finally, the two variables in tandem do have a strong impact on disproportionality (explained variance = .67).1c1
Electoral Formula and Multipartism
Lijphart detected a noticeable difference in multipartism between plurality and PR systems. However, he failed to find any differences within the PR family (see Table   4 ). In fact, by controlling for magnitude (see horizontal magnitude categories in Source: (Lijphart, 19'90: 490) .
The findings on the relationship between formula and multipartism in the Latin American and Caribbean data once again tend to parallel Lijphart's."
As shown in Table 5 , no strong relationship within the PR family was discovered. When formula was held constant, in two out of three cases, the d'Hondt systems were more fractionaltied than the LR-Hare systems. Finally, a difference between plurality and PR systems was similar to that found by Lijphart (1990: 490) .
The difference between plurality-majority systems and the PR systems found by Lijphart (after he restricted his analysis to plurality cases of the plurality-majority systems, which is the unanimous method used by the non-PR systems in this study) was 1.53 (4.07-2.54). This is somewhat similar to that found in this study 1.17 (3.42-2.25), though the different set of magnitudes and formulas in the two studies prevent us from making any direct comparisons of the data. In sum, the non-Anglo-European data suggest that in regard to the differences between plurality and PR systems, electoral formula is related to multipartism.
Ek~cIoroi 1'NW.s im Ldll A JJwi-iix crtrcl the c'hil~ocw N Furthermore, they provide reasonably strong support for Lijphart's conclusion that formula has no impact on multipartism within the PR family, though the question of why the d'Hondt systems tend to be more fr~ctionalized remains to be explained.
District Magnitude and Multipartism
hi his replication of the impact of district magnitude on multipartism, Lijphart (19$X): ci90) finds a positive relationship between magnitude and multipartism. As was the case regarding disproportionality, the largest difference Lijphart found W;IS between s~l~l~-nl~nlb~r districts and the smallest mLilti-m~mb~r district category. with the differences within the multi-member districts being quite small. Holding formula constant.
Lijphart continued to kind a similar positive rdationshil3 between magnitude and multipartism as can be observed in the vertical PR columns in Table 4 . The Latin American and Caribbean data also tend to exhibit (with one exception) the small positive relationship between magnitude ;tnci multipartism (see Table 5 ). Tht weakness of these results does, however, call into question the nl~~~nin~fillness of these findings. This trend of ;I small monotonic relationship between these two variables is noted in the first. second and fourth magnitude categories, hut m3t the third (5-10). When holding electoral formula constant the relationship hetwern magnitude and multipartism can be described as weak :tt 13est, with only two of three magnitude categories in each formula conforming to the hypothcsizeti positive r~i~iti~~~~sl3il3 between district n~~~~nitu~l~ and niLiiti~~isI31.
Electoral Disproportionality and Multipartism
Lijphart coneludcci that the indel3endent v:Mables (formula and m:tgnitucte) h;lvc :I strong impact on ciisproportionality.
but ;I very marginal impact on il~Liltil~~~isn~. Lijphart explains this situation by noting that clisprol3ortioii"lit):
(which intervenes between the independent variables and muitipartism) has :I very we:& iml3act on the number of p;lrtirs in an electoral system. He goes on to qualify this assertion in three ways (1990: 4% was (-,633) with a t-ratio of (-3.868) (12 df) while the same coefficient for multipartism was (.003) with a t-ratio of (.027) (11 df). Finally, like Lijphart, our analysis found a very weak correlation (. 1 l), weaker in fact than that found by , between disproportionality and multipartism.
Thus far this study has supported the general findings of Lijphart, or least not strongly contradicted them. However, this is not the case when one divides the population, as Lijphart did, between plurality systems and PR systems and examines the separate correlations between disproportionality and multipartism. Here, the Latin American and Caribbean data reveal a strong positive correlation between disproportionality and multipartism for both the plurality (.57) and PR systems (.68).
These Endings are at odds with those of Lijphart and thus deserve further examination. First, one finds a high positive correlation between the two dependent variables (disproportionality and multipartism) for the plurality systems, which while interesting since the sign is in the opposite direction of that found by Rae, is suspect due to the very low variance of the multipartism variable within the plurality subset (variance = ,033, with a mean of 2.25).
More interesting is the very counterintuitive finding of a strong positive correlation between disproportionality and multipartism for the PR systems (.68). This result is contrary to both Giovanni Sartori's hypothesis of an inverse relationship between these two variables (Sartori, 1986: 54) as well as Lijphart's finding of virtually no correlation between these two variables (.02). This finding thus suggests a limit to the generalizability of traditional Anglo-European assumptions about the relationship between proportionality and multiparty systems.
This positive relationship between disl'roportionali~ and multipartism is perhaps due to the presence of a popularly elected president alongside a legislature elected using PR in 12 of the 14 PR cases. It would appear that in these systems the AngloEuropean based assumptions that increased multipartism either leads to decreased disproportionality (Sartori) or has no effect on disproportionality (Lijphart) do not apply. in one round of voting (that is. not nceding 50 per cent of the vote to be clcctccl);
(2) systems in which the elections are hdcl concurrently lull of the time and the executive is usually elected in the first round; (3) systems in which the elections are held concurrently and the executive is usually selected in a second round of voting (that is, over 50 per cent of the vote is needed to win in the Brst round): (4) systems in which the elections are held concurrently half of the time and the president is usually elected in the second round; and (5) systems in which the elections are not held concurrently. For analytic purposes these five categories were collapsed first into three ordinal categories: concurrent, hybrid and separate.'l Three types of analysis (the examination of cross tabulations, OLS regression analysis, and a difference of means test) provide partial support for Sbugart's premise that the degree of temporal concurrence of presidential elections has an inverse relationship with the level of multipartism and hence indirectly with the amount of disproportionality of an electoral system. Examination of cross tabulations found the concurrent systems to have lower levels of disproportional&y than the separate systems. However, these findings were tainted by the unhypothesized position of the hybrid system as the most f~ctionaiized and dis~rop[)~i(~~l. Within magnitude and formula analysis also yielded inconclusive results with some categories following the hypothesized trend and others confounding it. OLS regression analysis yielded similar inconclusive results. While the relationship between degree of concurrence (holding magnitude constant) and the two dependent variables was in the hypothesized direction, it was very weak. Analysis also was conducted by co~nbi~li~~~ the hybrid and separate categories, yielding a hinary variable. Analysis using this variable (once again holding magnitude constant), revealed that the estimated coefficients for the impact of degree of concurrence on both disproportionality and multipartism were also very modest.'3 Finally, the Argentine electoral system provides us with four elections, two of which occurred concurrently with the election for president, and two occ~med independently of a presidential election. A difft!rence of means test of the levels of rnLllti~~isrn and disproportionality reveals support for Shugart's hypothesis with the differences for both being significant at the .l level (one tail test). In sum, these three different types of analysis demonstrate that the timing of presidential elections does tend to have a modest impact on the level of multipartism and disproportionality in a nation. However, this impact is not as strong as suggested by Sl~ugart.~+
Summary
Our study based on Latin American and Caribbean data has confirmed (either in whole or in part) almost all of the Sepmte relationships among electoral formula and average district nla~nitLlde and among electoral disl?r(,p"ftionality and electoral multipartism found by Lijphart in the Anglo-European experience. The findings most strongly supported were: the predicted relationship between formula and disproportionality (with disproportionality decreasing as one moved from the (hypothesized) least proportional system (phrdlity) towards the most proportional category (LR-Hare)), along with the inverse relationship posited between magnitude and disl~rol~~)~ionality. Less well SLIl~s~ntiate~i, yet nevertheless partially confirmed was the relationship between formula and multipartism (that is. a difference between plurality and PR but no monotonic difference within the PR family), as well as the small, yet positive relationship between magnitude and multipartism. Finally Lijphart's overall conclusion, that formula and magnitude have a strong Oceania. These contributions would not only help the evaluation of Lijphart's reanalysis as a basic general theory of the impact of electoral laws, but would also provide a useful resource to policy makers attempting to craft an electoral system that is ideal for their specific nation.
Notes
1. In one of the most noted reviews of the field of electoral systems research (l.ijphart, 1985) an overwhelming majority of the works cited by Lijphart as 'significant' possess an almost exclusive Anglo-European
focus. An exception is Nohlen (1978 (Rae, 197 1, Appendix C).
3. Disproportiondlity represents the 'sum of the diffcrcnccs between the vote proportions and the seat proportions' divided by two. D = l/2 Sum of all cases [V -S] where '1) is (one half of) the extent to which the distribution of seats won S dots not mirror the distribution of votes cast V for all parties' (Loosemore and Hanby, 1971: 468-c) ). 4. Muhipdrtism is measured using the Same frdctionalization index used by Lijphart, whcrc the 'index of frdctionalization is represented by F and the effective number of partics by N' (1990: (deemed the most important in all four cases) were used because in each count? the ~~ppcr tier legislators arc elected on a separate ballot 10. In the OLS regression analysis employed in this study: formula was measured using a logged dummy variable which divided the systems between PR and plurality systems, magnitude was measured using the log of the actual district magnitude (Shugart, 198X) (cxcrpt in the case of Venezuela which had one adjusted magnitude added to its average clisrict magnitude to compensate for its second-tier elections), and finally the timing of prcsidcntial elections was measured by both a logged three and two point variable which is more fully tlrscribcd in the section on the timing of presidential elections Il. The case of Ecuador was excluded from the cross tab analysis of multipartism due to its highly unusual party system (fr;ictiondlization = 10.85). For similar reasons it was also excluded from all regression analysis examining the impact of magnitutle and the timing of presidential elections on multipartism. 12. The countries in each of the five categories are as follows: (I) Costa Rica. Dominican Republic, Honduras. llruguay, Venezuela; (2) Argentina; (3) Bolivia. Guatemala; (4) Ecuador; (5) Chile. Colombia, El Salvador. Concurrent:
(1); Hybrid: (23.4); Separate: (5). 13. The estimated coefficients and t-ratios for the impact of (log scale) the three point presidential timing variable (holding magnitude constant) on disl'ropo~i"nali~ and multipartisni (with nine degrees of frcetlom for disproportionality and eight for multipartism due to the exclusion of Ecuaclor from the latter category) wcrc (. 178, I-.40X) ant1 (.2.33. 16.944) rcspcctively.
For the same test using the binaT presidential timing variable the results were (.193 . r-1.145) and (.124. l-1.275). 14. Preliminary clata analysis in a current project has tentatively provided stronger support for Shugart's hypothesis than have the tlata examined here.
